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Abstract: 
This thesis investigates the role states play in promoting and directing a country’s 
development. More specifically, it is examined, which factors determine differences 
in state performance and why different types of states form. This is done through a 
comparative case study of Botswana and Zambia, two southern African countries that 
after a similar start into independence developed very differently. By looking at those 
two cases it is found that in both countries the level of congruence between pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial state had a strong influence on the type of state 
that formed after independence. Further, it is found that the respective states played a 
key role in determining developmental success or failure. Botswana’s strong 
developmental state was able to lead Botswana towards successful economic 
development. Zambia’s development, on the other hand, suffered greatly under its 
neo-patrimonial state for years. These findings support arguments for an increased 
focus on the state as an agent of development and raise questions concerning the, until 
recently, highly influential neo-liberal arguments for a minimal state and free market 
forces.  
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 3 
1.Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Topic of the thesis 
 
“Africa poses the development challenge of our time. 
The economies of Africa remain poor. And the quality of Africa’s  
politics impact adversely the performance of its economies. Those of  
us who are scholars must continue to search out the lessons Africa 
is trying to teach us about the political foundations of development.” 
(Robert H. Bates, 2005: xiii) 
 
 
Against the background of most African countries’ continuous difficulties to catch up 
with the rest of the world regarding levels of development in general1 and economic 
development more specifically, the discussion of the state’s role in achieving 
successful development seems highly relevant and will provide the basis for this 
paper. 
 In the field of political science, the role of the state has always been an area of 
major focus (Fukuyama, 2004: 3). Questions like “How is a good state organised?”, 
“What are the roles of an ideal state?” and “What should a state not be involved in?” 
have been discussed widely in the field for a long time. Also in the field of 
development studies the role of the state has always been a hotly discussed issue. 
Perceptions of the state’s role in successful development of a country varied 
extremely over time. This ranged from the international community’s belief in 
Keynesian ideas of pubic sector-led development in the post-World War II period 
(Ndue, 1999: 76), dependency theory’s arguments for a strong state controlling the 
market that was the dominant idea in the 1960s and 70s (Stein, 2000: 1), to neo-liberal 
arguments for a minimal state and free market forces that dominated discourse in the 
                                                
1 Since the term development is a highly contested one, some specifications seem to be in place. The 
main focus in the following will be on economic development. This does, however, not mean that other 
sides of development are not found to be important. The word development can for example also be 
understood as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen, 1999: 3), meaning 
that development is the process of removing major sources of unfreedom like for example poverty, 
tyranny and social deprivation (Ibid.). In doing that, successful economic development plays an 
important role but is not the only thing necessary. The different factors that the human development 
index consists of cover those non-economic issues (see UN 2009). Due to the limited space, however, 
they will only be addressed briefly.  
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1980s and 90s (Fine and Stoneman, 1996: 7; Leftwich, 1996: 12, Potter, 2008: 69; 
Chang and Rowthorn, 1995: 2).  
 During the last decade, however, perceptions regarding the state’s role in 
achieving development began to change once more. In opposition to the dominant 
neo-liberal paradigm against state intervention in the market due to its supposed 
harmfulness to (particularly economic) development, some scholars began to argue 
for a renewed focus on the state as a possible agent of successful development, a 
“developmental state” (Kohli, 2004: 10). This reconsideration of the state’s role 
happened against the background of the recent developmental success of the East-
Asian countries. In those, the state played a strong role in directing economic 
development, which then led to an increase in overall-development of the region (see 
for example Amsden, 1989; Kohli, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004).  
 Against the background of these findings, a renewed focus on the state, or as 
Bates puts it “the political foundations of development” could possibly elucidate some 
of the yet unidentified reasons for a lot of African countries’ struggle to catch up with 
the rest of the world. 
 
1.2. Purpose and problem 
 
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the role, the state plays in promoting 
development and further, to investigate, which factors determine differences in state 
performance.2 This will be done, by examining the role the respective state played in 
two sub-Saharan African countries’ greatly varying development situations. Botswana 
on the one hand is called “a growth miracle” (Hillbom, 2008: 191) and “a shining 
example of liberal democracy” (Tsie, 1996: 599). Zambia, on the other hand is after 
45 years of independence still one of the poorest African countries (IMF, 2009), with 
a history of economic and political crisis. Hence, the question that comes up first 
when reading about the two countries is: “Why can two similar countries in the same 
region develop so differently and how did that happen?”. Keeping the focus of this 
paper on the state’s role in mind, the main questions that arise when looking at the 
two country cases are: Which role did the two states play in achieving different 
developmental success in Zambia and Botswana? Were the respective states the 
                                                
2 The concept of state is used in this paper as defined by Max Weber. Hence, a state is understood as “a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory” (Max Weber quoted in Fukuyama, 2004: 6) 
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reason for the two countries developing so differently? Also, it would be highly 
interesting to know if there has to be a certain set of preconditions to make successful 
state-influenced development possible. A further, related question to be looked at in 
the paper is the question of whether or not one can at all make any generalisations 
regarding the reasons for different states’ different success or failure like it has been 
done in several studies (Englebert, 2000a; Englebert, 2000b; Sylwester, 2008; Kohli, 
2004). This seems highly important because the lessons learned from the two cases 
analysed here could possibly benefit other countries in similar situations. Also, by 
bringing the “state back in” development discourse could create a renewed focus on 
political aspects of development, in contrast to the still dominant focus on economic 
aspects.  
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis  
 
The second chapter will contain the theoretical basis of the paper. It will be started 
with a short review and a critical assessment of preceding works on the topic, 
followed by an outline of the theoretical framework used. The third chapter will deal 
with the methodological considerations this thesis is based on. It will be looked at the 
method chosen and some benefits and problems regarding the Most-Similar-Systems-
Design method will be discussed. The fourth part will introduce the two country cases 
by looking at both states’ role in development and the process of state formation. 
Further, commonalities and differences between the two cases will be analysed. The 
fifth chapter will conclude. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
2. Theoretical Framework  
 
 
 
 
What is the role of a state in a country’s development and why are some states better 
in administrating development than others? What are the reasons for these differences 
and are there generalisable reasons? In order to gain an insight into the possible 
answers to these questions a critical review of theories on different state types and 
theories that aim to explain differences in states’ success to administer development 
will be given in section 2.1. More specifically, it will first be looked at theories on 
different types of states and consequently it will be looked at theories explaining why 
different state types form. 
 Based on this, a theoretical framework for the analysis of the two cases will be 
developed in section 2.2. This framework will be the theoretical foundation of this 
paper and will be tested through an application to the two country cases. 
 
 
2.1. Conceptual Background  
 
According to several scholars, the state plays a vital role in achieving developmental 
success (Englebert, 2000b; Kohli, 2004; Leftwich, 1996; Fukuyama, 2004; Sen, 
1999). The explanations these scholars give for why some states achieve this success 
and other do not, however, point to different reasons. Some only focus on an 
explanation for success in economic development. Others look at development in a 
more holistic way by including social and human aspects of development and 
theorising about what is necessary for a state to also achieve those aspects of 
development for its people. All of them address very important points but leave some 
other important points unaddressed. By critically examining several works, strengths 
and weaknesses will be identified and consequently used in section 2.2. in order to 
develop a framework appropriate for addressing the questions raised in this paper.  
 
 Atul Kohli’s book “State-directed development” will serve as the foundation 
of a classification of state types and will be supplemented by other scholars’ works. In 
the book he develops a theory that aims to explain why states perform differently well 
in directing the country’s economic development based on examination of four 
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country cases. His main argument is that “successful states possessed a greater degree 
of power to define and pursue their goals” (Kohli, 2004: 20). Hence, the more 
powerful states are better in achieving successful and fast economic development. 
Through a historical analysis of the four countries’ development he defines three 
different types of states with different amount of power at their disposal, that all stand 
for a different degree of developmental success. The three state types are a cohesive 
capitalist state3, a neo-patrimonial state and a fragmented multi-class state4 (Ibid.: 9, 
381, 393, 399).  
 
 Kohli finds that cohesive-capitalist states “have proved to be the most 
effective agents of rapid industrialisation in the global periphery and efficacious in 
creating new wealth in poor societies”. Pierre and Peters add that these also called 
“developmental states” did so “through creating powerful states that could then both 
direct foreign and internal investment and create the political stability needed to 
encourage foreign investment” (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 181). In the cohesive-
capitalist type, the state generally intervenes heavily in the economy to mobilise 
capital and work force to increase industrial production (Kohli, 2004: 391). Also, 
contrary to neo-liberal believes developmental states subsidise inputs, while at the 
same time promoting exports (Vu, 2007: 27). Moreover, the state elite is mostly 
closely linked to the industrial elites, and workers and peasants are excluded from 
spheres of influence (Kohli, 2004: 13; Leftwich, 1996: 184; Vu, 2007: 28), which 
leads to a congruence of state policy and market interest. Regarding this finding, and 
following van de Walle (Van de Walle, 2009: 321) it could however, be examined if it 
is possible that this formation in some cases facilitates the establishment of 
clientelistic networks that are more common in neo-patrimonial states. 
 It is assumed that state elites in developmental states are highly committed to 
economic growth, transformation and development and have the power to “push it 
through” (Leftwich, 1996: 285). With this follows, however, that developmental states 
are generally right-wing authoritarian states in which highly competent bureaucrats 
organise society from the top and develop the plans needed to achieve fast growth 
                                                
3 Cohesive-capitalist states are called “developmental state” by other authors, based on Chalmer 
Johnson’s work on the Japanese post-World War II development (see Johnson 1982; Leftwich 1996; 
Englebert 2000a; Radice 2008). The words cohesive-capitalist and developmental state will in the 
following be used interchangeably. 
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(Kohli, 2004: 380). The societies of these states on the other hand have been rather 
compliant, rarely revolting against the stringent state policies and hence making these 
policies possible (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 181). Civil society in developmental states 
is often weak, either by nature or because of severe repression by the state. Also, and 
in relation to that, most developmental states are not democracies (Leftwich, 1996: 
284, 287). This developmental or cohesive-capitalist state is, however, a rare type of 
state due to the difficulty to construct it and can rarely be found to endure for a longer 
period of time (Kohli, 2004: 419). 
 
 The opposite of cohesive-capitalist states, which can be found more often in 
reality, are according to Kohli neo-patrimonial states5. According to Nicholas van de 
Walle, many African states unfortunately fall into the neo-patrimonial category, and 
neo-patrimonial practices coexist with modern bureaucracy (van de Walle, 2001: 51).6 
Rather, than boosting economic development, these types of state mostly harm the 
country’s economy during their rule (Kohli, 2004: 15, 393).  
 Neo-patrimonial states are characterised by a state in which power is highly 
concentrated, often in the office of the president (Van de Walle, 2001: 52; Gordon and 
Gordon, 2007: 77). Moreover, the state elite pursues personal goals, often through an 
extensive network of clientelistic relations. Public and private sphere are not 
separated, like it is assumed to be the case in modern states (von Soest, 2007: 623, 
624; Englebert, 2000a: 72). Instead, government elites make use of public resources 
for their personal benefit or to further cultivate their network of support through 
patronage (Van de Walle, 2001: 52; Kohli, 2004: 394). Also, neo-patrimonial states 
tend to have a large but rather incompetent bureaucracy, as opposed to the highly 
organised and professional one in developmental states. This effectuates that the 
state’s “downward reach” is limited, meaning that the state is disconnected from 
society (Kohli, 2004: 15, 393). Hence, the neo-patrimonial state is unable to mobilise 
its citizens for development because a “joint national project” is missing (Ibid.: 394).  
                                                
5 Neo-patrimonial states are by others sometimes also called “predatory states” (see Pierre and Peters, 
2000; Fukuyama, 2004). 
6 Though present in many African countries, Van de Walle stresses that neo-patrimonialism is not 
inherent in African culture but a result of the way states were formed after colonialism (Van de Walle, 
2001: 127). 
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 Like cohesive-capitalist states, neo-patrimonial states intervene strongly in the 
country’s economy, though often with different objectives.7 Rather than driven by a 
dedication to growth, the elite of a neo-patrimonial state intervenes to consolidate 
their power and enrich themselves and their supporters (Van de Walle, 2001: 53). 
 
 The last type of state in Kohli’s classification is a fragmented multi-class state, 
which can be placed between the other two types when it comes to it’s success in 
developing the country economically. This type of state is the most “normal” one 
(Ibid.: 14), and characterised by a fragmented state elite and a broader base of social 
power. The state elite is committed to state-led development but cannot always 
achieve it because of the fragmentation of its power. Too many different interests 
make the pursuance of one goal difficult (Ibid.: 399). Though very interesting, this 
state type will not be discussed further here, since it is not as relevant for the two 
cases to be looked at in this paper. 
 
 The second part of the theoretical section will move away from Kohli’s work 
as a foundation. The focus will be on theories that can be used for explaining why 
states form into the just described different types. With regard to the distinction of 
different state types, Kohli’s work is highly relevant for the purpose of this paper. His 
construction of the three state types that explain the different development outcomes 
of the four country cases provides a good basis for the analysis of the cases of this 
paper. However, his explanation for why states’ institutions form in different ways 
seems incomplete.  
 Kohli argues that the institutional set-up of the state determines the amount of 
power a state commands.8 The institutional set-up in turn, is in most developing 
countries a product of the respective colonial power’s influence.9 Also, Kohli finds in 
his analysis of the four country cases, that the influence of different colonial powers 
led to the formation of different post-colonial, independent states (Ibid.: 18, 291, 412). 
 He argues that the different colonial powers, through their different modes to 
colonise, promoted different types of state type formation. Also, he finds that British 
                                                
7 In the few cases where the neo-patrimonial elite really has the aim to promote growth, the attempt is 
likely to fail because of the unfavourable institutional set-up (Kohli, 2004: 394). 
8 It is talked about “amounts of power” because Kohli views power in his book as a resource rather 
than in distributional term (Kohli, 2004: 20). 
9 Though Kohli admits that other factors than the colonial power could have played a role in 
determining the institutional set-up as well (Kohli, 2004: 17). 
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colonialism in Africa tended to lead to the formation of neo-patrimonial states after 
independence due to British reluctance to invest in their colonies (Ibid.: 309, 409). 
The incompleteness and maybe even incorrectness of these two findings becomes 
apparent when looking at the two cases dealt with in this paper. Both, Botswana and 
Zambia were former British colonies and as will be argued later on, formed into very 
different types of states after the end of colonialism. Hence, in order to explain why 
the two states developed so very differently, despite both countries being influenced 
by the same colonial power, further explanation is needed. For this, Pierre Englebert’s 
work on state legitimacy seems to offer some interesting explanations, especially 
regarding the African context. These will in the following be examined and 
supplemented with other relevant ideas.  
 Englebert argues that state legitimacy, as perceived by the country’s citizens, 
determines the type of state a country has and how well the country performs in 
achieving development (Englebert, 2000a: 5). Like Kohli he looks at countries’ 
history to find clues about the different development performance of countries. Unlike 
Kohli, however, he begins his analysis already in pre-colonial history. In Africa a 
significantly high number of states were created by the colonial powers, disregarding 
former geographical and social arrangements (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 186). Unlike 
argued by the colonial powers and quite a few scholars at a later date, there were 
political systems before the beginning of colonialism in Africa. One of those nation-
like formation were the Asante who ruled in what now is Ghana, and who were highly 
organised, having police and army, known territorial limits, a national language and 
law (Davidson, 1992: 59, 62, 63). Hence, colonialism did not replace and form 
“nothing” but actual nations and “Africa [actually] stands out as the continent which 
in the pre-colonial period provided the largest number of emergent state systems” 
(Persson, 2008: 114). In most cases though, it was not these indigenous forms of 
organisation that were re-established after independence. Rather, “black men in white 
masks” (skin replaced by men, Fanon, 1967) were put into power by the colonial 
state. These elites were, however, often perceived as alien by the people and unlike 
the rest of the country they believed in the need to reject all tradition and build the 
new state on European foundations (Davidson, 1992: 33). “As a result, the colonial 
state was always a foreign creation, superimposed on and separate from the local 
society and its customs, and regarded as deeply illegitimate.” (Van de Walle, 2009: 
315).  
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 In line with that, Englebert, using cross-sectional data, finds that states, which 
are to a high level congruent with the pre-colonial “political systems and norms of 
authority” turned out to be considered as more legitimate by the citizens and 
performed therefore better with regard to the country’s postcolonial development 
(Englebert, 2000b: 13). Most African countries, however, had to deal with 
“superimposed …highly divergent and artificial geographical forms and the distortion 
of traditional social and economic patterns (Gordon and Gordon, 2007: 60). In most 
of those countries, there is only a low level of congruence between pre- and post-
colonial state structures and the post-colonial political elites were faced with having 
inherited a state that was not perceived as legitimate by the citizens (Englebert, 2000a: 
97). As Englebert puts it: “African ‘inheritance elites’ were bequeathed the colonial 
state but not the colonial power that forced it and kept it in order (Englebert, 2000c: 
1823). Hence, “for leaders newly installed at the national level, the challenge was to 
balance rival power brokers who based their influence on ethnicity, religion or region 
and prevent their mutual antagonisms from getting out of control” (Boone, 2003: 
121). 
 Consequently, the more illegitimate a state is, the more likely are political 
elites to resort to the types of neo-patrimonial policies described above, in order to 
balance these rivalling powers and interests. This however, leads to poor governance 
and economic stagnation, which in turn makes the patron-client networks even more 
important because they substitute the legitimacy that cannot be gained through 
economic success (Englebert, 2000b: 29, Kohli, 2004: 394).  
 Therefore, in order to gain legitimacy, there were two main strategies, which 
elites of illegitimate states employed in order to secure their power.10 The first 
strategy, Englebert calls “revolutionary-centralising trend”. The state elite tries to 
build one nation through initiating revolutionary processes, renaming the country after 
an old kingdom, or giving the president a meaningful name, or abolishing of 
ethnicity-based parties and groupings (Englebert, 2000a: 98). For example president 
Mobutu called himself Sese Seko Kuku Mgbendo Wazabanga and “encouraged the 
press to call him ‘the guide’” (Van de Walle, 2001: 117). The second strategy, which 
often follows upon the first strategy because of whose limited success, is called 
                                                
10 Kohli also identifies those strategies but speaks of both under the name of neo-patrimonial state 
behaviour. 
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“pragmatic-pluralistic pattern” (Englebert, 2000a: 99). Following this strategy, state 
elites resort to clientelistic networks in order to ensure their power.  
 In most African countries, at the time of independence, there were at least 
several different elites competing for leadership, often due to the “divide-and-rule 
strategies of colonialism (Van de Walle, 2001: 115). Therefore, if all competing 
groups can be involved in the clientelistic network, the chances of one elite to stay in 
power increase because all those that profit from the system will not fight it. 
Therefore, in a low-legitimacy state, elites tend not to spend time on policies 
beneficial to the country’s development but rather concentrate all their energy on 
securing their power. In legitimate states on the other hand, elites do not have to be 
concerned with securing their power because they are the accepted leaders. Hence, in 
those states a focus can be put on policies that are good for the country’s development 
(Englebert, 2000a: 100). 
 In agreement with Kohli, for Englebert state power plays a very important role 
in being a successfully developing country. What is added to Kohli’s theory, however, 
is an explanation for why some states control more power than others. Englebert’s 
line of argumentation offers an explanation for the variance in state formation in 
countries with the same colonial power that is highly needed for the purpose of this 
paper, and that Kohli’s and most other scholars’ findings cannot explain.11 
 
 
2.2. Theoretical framework for further analysis 
 
After examining different theoretical approaches several factors can be identified that 
explain a state’s developmental success or failure and why states form so very 
differently even though starting with similar preconditions.  
 First, there are different types of states that are differently successful in 
directing development, and two state types, the developmental and the neo-
patrimonial state are specifically interesting with regard to the cases discussed in the 
following. Moreover, the amount of power a state commands is crucial in reaching 
developmental success and the two types of states command differently much power. 
Developmental states command high amounts of power and are therefore 
developmentally most successful. Neo-patrimonial states on the other hand 
                                                
11 Though for example Van de Walle acknowledges and integrates Englebert’s explanation in his works 
published after 2000.  
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substantially do not have power and can therefore not successfully direct the country’s 
development. 
 Second, in order to explain why different types of states form, looking at state 
legitimacy and history matters. The power a state commands, and hence the type of 
state, is determined by the amount of legitimacy it has towards its citizens, which in 
turn is mainly a result of historical legacies. The better the pre-colonial arrangements 
fit the post-colonial ones, the more legitimate is a state perceived to be by its citizens. 
States perceived as being illegitimate have to focus their energy on staying in power 
and creating some kind of legitimacy and hence do not focus on the development of 
the country. 
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3. Methodological considerations 
 
 
 
 
In the following some methodological considerations concerning the research design 
will be addressed. Since this paper is a comparative case study and the case study as a 
scientific method is still subject to much criticism (Yin, 2009: 6), it seems appropriate 
to explain its scientific usefulness, specifically in the context of this paper. 
Subsequently, the choice of cases will be explained. 
 
3.1. Discussion of the choice of methodology  
 
In the following it will first be looked at the reasons for choosing a comparative case 
study method for this research. Afterwards, some of the limitations of this method 
will be examined. 
 “The case study is but one of several ways of doing social science research” 
(Yin, 2009: 2). It is however, according to Robert Yin a well-suited method when the 
aim of the research is to look into questions of “why” and “how” of contemporary 
events that cannot, like an experiment, be manipulated and therefore controlled by the 
researcher (Ibid.: 8, 11, 13). Since exactly that is the case in this paper, by trying to 
find explanations for two countries’ very differing development, it was chosen to use 
a comparative case study methodology over other methodologies. Moreover, as 
Khairul B. M. Noor explains, “case studies become particularly useful where one needs 
to understand some particular problem or situation in great-depth, and where one can 
identify cases rich in information” (Noor, 2008: 1602, 1603). Hence, examining the 
difference in development performance of two countries and the reasons for the different 
performance can be understood as the particular problem that needs to be analysed in 
depth and a comparative case study will be used to do so.  
 More specifically, the research design chosen here is a most similar systems 
design (MSSD) that “seeks to identify the key features that are different among [two] 
similar countries and which account for the observed political outcome” (Landman, 
2007: 70). This design seems to be the most appropriate because the two countries 
analysed in this research, Botswana and Zambia, have a variety of commonalities but 
the outcome to be explained, developmental success, varied greatly in the two 
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countries. The outcome can also be called the dependent variable in this research 
(Landman, 2007: 19) and like Moses and Knutsen explain, comparative studies select 
cases on the dependent variable (Moses and Knutsen, 2007: 95).   
 
  Coming to the limitations of the use of comparative case studies, an issue that 
is very often subject to criticism is the issue of generalisability. It is argued by a 
number of scholars that an aim of social science is the generation of generalisable 
knowledge and case studies are due to the limited sample size not suited for fulfilling 
this task (Landman, 2007: 4; Yin, 2009: 15; Ruddin, 2006: 799; Noor, 2008: 1603)12. 
In opposition to this criticism, however, it can be argued that this method is well 
suited for reaching analytical generalisations. As Yin explains, there should be 
distinguished between “statistical generalisation” and “analytical generalisation”, the 
latter being used to compare a primarily developed theory with empirical results as is 
done in case of a case study. If the cases analysed support this theory and better than a 
competing theory, then “replication can be claimed” (Yin, 2009: 38, 39; Ruddin, 
2006: 800). Regarding this paper, the theoretical assumptions outlined above are what 
is to be tested and possibly improved through application to the two country cases. 
Hence, the aim is first to test theory but potentially also to generate hypothesis 
through the findings made in the case analysis (Moses and Knutsen, 2007: 132, 133). 
It should, however, be emphasised that the primary aim of this work is the answering 
of the research questions with regard to the two specific country cases. It is only 
hoped that the findings of this research can also be relevant for the analysis of 
countries in similar circumstances. Hence, it is more transferability than 
generalisability that is attempted.  
 
3.2. Selection of cases 
 
The two cases selected for this research are Botswana and Zambia. As explained 
above, they were selected on the dependent variable, which in this case is their 
development performance. Also, it was these two countries that were chosen, because 
besides this difference in the dependent variable, they have a lot in common, which 
makes a MSSD possible in order to explain the differences.  
                                                
12 A review of several critics can be found in Anja Persson’s book “The institutional sources of 
statehood” (2008: 41). 
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 The commonalities that both countries shared at independence are various. To 
begin with, both Zambia and Botswana are countries in southern Africa and they are 
both landlocked.13 Further, they have both been British colonies for roughly the same 
amount of time and reached independence, similarly, as some of the first countries of 
southern Africa. Zambia in 1964 and Botswana in 1966 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
2009). Also, they both are mineral producing and exporting countries, though Zambia 
exports copper while Botswana exports diamonds (Davis, 1998: 219, 222; Good, 
1992: 75). Further, both countries proceeded into independence suffering from 
colonial neglect; meaning that both started into independence without much 
infrastructure, industry and graduates. Though, Zambia had a slight advantage over 
Botswana regarding industrialisation (Good and Taylor, 2008: 753; Van de Walle, 
2001: 129; Rakner, 2001: 44, 47; Acemoglu et al., 2003: 80).14  
 Despite all these similarities at independence however, the two countries 
developed very differently over the following decades and up to the present day. 
Botswana is often being described as a “growth miracle”, “an oasis of tolerance” and 
a “shining example of liberal democracy” (Hillbom, 2008: 191; Tsie, 1996: 599). 
Moreover, it is now being classified as an upper-middle income country and a stable 
democracy (Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005: 8; Holm, 1996: 101). Zambia, on the other 
hand has long been seen as a “non-reformer” (Rakner et al., 1999: 8) with democracy-
problems at least until 1991 (Rakner, 2001: 2) and now still occupies a place in the 
lower end of the Human Development Index (HDI) rankings, more precisely place 
165 out of 177 (WB, 2007). 
 Against this background those two cases seem highly interesting to look at 
when trying to examine the state’s role in the countries’ different development 
performance. What did the Batswana state do in order for Botswana to, with equal 
staring positions do so much better with regards to development, than Zambia. Or, to 
ask the other way around, what did the Zambian state do wrong in order for its 
developmental record to look so much worse than Botswana’s a few decades after 
their similar start into independence?  
                                                
13 This is mentioned because there are theories saying that landlocked countries perform worse when it 
comes to economic development (see Sachs, 2005; Collier, 2008). 
14 Just to gibe an example: Zambia had 76 university graduates at independence, while Botswana had 
22 and only 100 persons that graduated from secondary school (Van de Walle, 2001: 129; Acemoglu et 
al., 2003: 80, 81). 
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 In the next section, these issues and specifically the questions posed in the 
introduction will be examined using the theoretical framework outlined in section 2. 
To assure clearness and following Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s advice to 
keep the cases focussed on the issues relevant to the research questions (George and 
Bennett, 2004: 70), Botswana’s and Zambia’s state’s developmental role and the state 
formation processes will be analysed separately, where after the main commonalities 
and differences between the two cases will be pointed out.  
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4. The Cases: Botswana and Zambia 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Botswana 
4.1.1. The state’s developmental role 
 
From 1966 on and until at present Botswana was ruled uninterruptedly by the 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)15. The BDP had from the beginning of its time in 
office on a strong focus on economic growth and capitalist economic development of 
the country (Tsie, 1996: 601; Taylor, 2005: 48). The establishment of a Ministry of 
Development Planning can for example illustrate this commitment to development 
right after independence in 1966 (Taylor, 2005: 50). “Responsible for the choosing of 
[these] appropriate priorities has been a top political leadership of 'unusually high 
quality', with both Seretse Khama and his successor, Quett Masire, notable for their 
honesty, pragmatism, and common sense “, which benefited the formation of a 
developmental state (Good, 1992: 74).16 That their sense of pragmatism was very 
pronounced can for example be seen in their decision to leave all expatriate 
bureaucrats in office after independence until suitable Batswana citizens were trained 
to take over (Acemoglu et al. 2003: 100, 101).  
 Further, the government and these bureaucratic elites (and later on the 
domestic ones) worked tightly together to reach the aim of development (Good, 1992: 
74), which lead to what Good and Taylor call a “typical developmental state situation, 
where the bureaucracy and the ruling party meshed” (Good and Taylor, 2008: 756). 
The politicians however, “allowed top civil servants who are more educated than 
politicians a relatively free hand in policy formulation” (Tsie, 1996: 611), which fit 
very well with the strong and effective bureaucracy that is characteristic of a 
developmental state (Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005: 4). Also, in order to reach 
development, the state intervened strongly in the economy, through for example a 
marketing board that controlled beef prices, a half-state owned diamond mining 
company, a strict exchange rate policy to prevent the exchange rate from rising like in 
                                                
15 Ian Taylor explains that reasons for this is partly that the British did not leave a military or organised 
bureaucracy that could pose serious competition to the BDP rule (Taylor, 2005: 47). 
16 Despite these qualities are these some more questionable attitudes of the Batswana presidents that 
will be looked at later on. 
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other mineral economies and prudent fiscal and monetary policies (Acemoglu et al., 
2003: 101, 102; Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 7). 
 Furthermore, another characteristic of the developmental state described above 
can be detected in Botswana, namely the connection between political and industrial 
elites (Kohli, 2004: 13; Leftwich, 1996: 184). In Botswana, this characteristic can be 
found especially pronounced, because many of the top bureaucrats and politicians 
were at independence large-scale cattle owners, are still among the wealthiest citizens 
and have a specific interest in the country’s economic development (Tsie, 1996: 601, 
602; Good and Taylor, 2006: 57). It could, however, in disagreement with theories on 
developmental states be argued that this close connection can instead of furthering 
development in some cases also carry neo-patrimonial elements (see Van de Walle, 
2009; Good and Taylor, 2006).17 
 This leads to some other, darker sides of the Batswana state and maybe 
developmental states in general: Their limited commitment to liberal democracy 
(Leftwich, 1996: 284, 287). Leftwich finds that Botswana is a rare example of a 
democratic developmental state (Leftwich, 1996: 283). Based on some more recent 
event and information it will, however, be pointed out here that Botswana’s 
democracy record is far from flawless. This seems relevant since it is not only 
economic wealth that marks development but also issues related to equality and 
freedom (Sen, 1999). 
 First, and interestingly in line with the characteristics of neo-patrimonial states 
(Van de Walle, 2001: 52) rather than developmental states, the president in Botswana 
has a “dominant power position” (Holm, 1996: 101). Exemplifying this, all presidents 
so far have induced constitutional changes to their favour and “repeatedly displayed 
an immediate reappointment of BDP members of parliament and ministers rejected 
democratically by their constituencies” (Good and Taylor, 2006: 54). Also, there are 
fears that Botswana’s new president, Seretse Khama’s son and ex-military Ian Khama 
will “introduce a more autocratic style” (Country monitor, 2008; Good and Taylor, 
2006: 6-68), which is all not exactly according to democratic principles. 
 Moreover, and that fits into the developmental state, civil society in Botswana 
is weak (Holm, 1996: 102) exemplified by weak labour unions, not one legal strike 
                                                
17 In Botswana, the biggest car magnate Satar Dada is an MP in parliament, the BDP’s treasurer and 
one of the richest men in the country. For election campaigns he organises the cars as well as for the 
national military (Good and Taylor, 2006: 63). Hence, if industrial and political interest are all to 
meshed, clientelistic practices seem unavoidable 
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since independence and relatively weak opposition parties due to a lack of resources 
(Holm, 1996: 104; Good and Taylor, 2006: 63). 
 Lastly, Botswana is one of the countries in the world with the highest 
inequality rates (appendix UN Gini coefficient, 2008), which also puts limits to 
democracy. Especially the rural population is poor and poverty among them is 
increasing ever since independence (Good, 1999: 190). Out of those poor, particularly 
the San or Basarwa are “the most exploited and impoverished” (Ibid.: 191). As 
Nengwekhulu describes that “some cattle barons still consider Baswara their personal 
property in the same way classical slave masters considered slaves their personal 
property” (Nengwekhulu, 1998: 353). Unfortunately, the impoverishment disables the 
poor to change their situation because the means for political or other involvement are 
missing (Ibid.: 359). 
 
4.1.2. Formation of the state 
 
In this section the “why-question” posed in the introduction will be addressed. Why 
did the Batswana state form the way it has just been outlined? While examining the 
state formation, it will be started with a brief look at the pre-colonial political 
structures, followed by colonial and post-colonial arrangements. This is done in order 
to be able to assess in how far those pre-colonial structures matched colonial and post-
colonial ones, which is believed to have an influence on the state’s legitimacy as 
explained in section 2.   
 Before Botswana was made a British Protectorate in 1885 (Ramsay, 1998: 62), 
the country consisted of eight chiefdoms18, all of which belonged to the ethnic group 
of the Tswana, and all of which were ruled by a kgosi (king) (Tlou: 1998: 11). 
Formerly independent, they united around the mid-19th century in order to prevent the 
Boers from occupying their territories (Acemoglu et al., 2003: 94). This development 
lead to the formation of, what is now called Botswana, a country with a rather 
homogeneous population. Botswana can be called homogeneous because roughly 70 
per cent of the population belong to the ethnic group of the Tswana and the remaining 
30 per cent to various other small ethnic groups like for example the San and Herero 
(Mompati and Prinsen, 2000: 628, 629). This is a fact beneficial to the state’s 
                                                
18 The eight tribes are: Batawana, Bakwena, Bangwato, Bangwaketese, Balete, Bakgatla, Barolong and 
Batlokwa; the first four being the biggest (Acemoglu et al. 2003: 92; Mompati and Prinsen, 2000: 627). 
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legitimacy and power base, because there have been hierarchical political structures in 
pre-colonial times that were agreed upon by the majority of the population. These 
structures survived into independence and therefore no rivalling elites (like for 
example in Nigeria) competed for power. 
 To see why the structures could survive into pre-colonial times, a look at the 
colonial period is necessary. Not very interested in Botswana in the first place, the 
British changed their mind after Germany occupied Namibia in 1884, and diamonds 
were found in Kimberly. Suddenly, Botswana was a strategically important place for 
the British and it became a protectorate in 1885 (Ramsay, 1998: 62). Due to its mere 
strategic importance however, the British established a system of ‘indirect rule’, under 
which colonial officials ruled through the kgosis (Ibid.: 69) and hence kept 
administration expenses at a minimum. This, though, had the side effect that pre-
colonial institutions remained for the most part unchanged and when the British 
decided to “once and for all establish (their) authority over the chiefs in the tribal 
territories” they could not succeed (Parson, 1984: 27 quoted by Acemoglu et al., 
2003: 97).   
 Despite the just mentioned protest by the chiefs against increased British 
control in the years before independence, there was a lack of forceful demand for 
independence like it was present in the surrounding countries. “Liberation from 
colonialism was not high on the agenda of Seretse Khama (the chief in exile of the 
Bangwato), nor of the inhabitants of Bechuanaland.” (Good and Taylor, 2008: 753; 
Acemoglu et al., 2003: 96). That was probably part of the reasons for why 
independence in 1966 came quietly and was prepared from approximately 1962 on 
and in cooperation with the British (Good and Taylor, 2008: 753).  
 “The colonial administration and the BDP leadership were 'joined in an 
informal coalition' to shape the country's politics and further development” (Good, 
1992: 72-73) and Botswana was from then on formally run by the BDP, with Serese 
Khama as its first leader. The BDP consisted mainly of a class of large-scale cattle 
owners, who did not have an anti-colonialist or African nationalist agenda like most 
of Botswana’s neighbours (Tsie, 1996: 602; Good and Taylor, 2008: 757). Further, 
Khama was not only the leader of the BDP but also the heir of one of the major 
Tswana tribes’ throne, which gave him, and therewith also the new independent state, 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens (Taylor, 2005: 47). This fits very well with 
Englebert’s theory on state legitimacy being essential for developmental success. This 
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legitimacy was present in Botswana due to the high level of congruence between pre- 
and postcolonial political structures. Hence, in disagreement with Kohli’s argument 
that British colonial neglect lead to weak states, the neglect in Botswana’s case was 
highly beneficial to the post-colonial state, since it made the high level of congruence 
between pre- and post-colonial structures possible. Therefore, it is a main reason for 
the Batswana state’s legitimacy, and as a result power. 
  Furthermore, the traditional chiefs were included in the state and therewith 
neutralised as competitors to the government, by making them civil servants that 
receive a salary from the state and as civil servants are to be loyal to the state (Jones, 
1983: 136). Despite that however, traditional structures were roughly maintained 
because the chiefs brought government policy to the village level. For example five-
year development plans from the government were introduced and discussed at the 
traditional village meeting, kgotla, by the chiefs and the villagers. Also, many 
Batswana considered Seretse Khama to be the kgosi of all Botswana (Holm, 1996: 
101). It can be argued that, in line with Englebert (2000a, 2000b) all this helped to 
increase state legitimacy because policies were communicated in the traditional way. 
 
4.2. Zambia 
4.2.1. The state’s developmental role 
 
Zambia’s state changed significantly over time from independence in 1964 to the 
present day. Roughly, the time since independence is divided into three phases: The 
first republic from 1964 until the end of 1972, second republic from 1973 until 1991 
and third republic from 1991 until today (Macola, 2008: 17; Rakner, 1998: 59). 
 During these 45 years, Zambia has been ruled by two parties and in total three 
presidents. According to Nicholas van de Walle, this lies above the, in any way high, 
African average of state leaders’ tenure length (van de Walle, 2005: 74 quoted in von 
Soest, 2007: 625). The first of the three presidents, Kenneth Kaunda and his party the 
United National Independence Party (UNIP) were in office from independence until 
1991 and as early as in 1972 changed Zambia’s constitution to make it a one-party 
state (Burnell, 2001: 245). Due to Kaunda being in office during first and second 
republic and similar policies, these episodes will be treated together here. This will be 
followed by an examination of the state’s role in development during the third 
republic. 
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 During Kaunda’s time in office, he used an extensive public sector to create 
employment and strengthen his power through the establishment of clientelist 
structures, characteristic of neo-patrimonial states (Hawkins, 1991: 841; Good, 1986: 
251, 254). Hence, in the years after independence, the number of civil servants 
increased dramatically from 22.500 in 1964 to 51.000 in 1969, though their skills did 
not increase in an according speed (Rakner, 1998: 49; Tordoff; 1980: 6, 7). Also, as 
another characteristic of a neo-patrimonial state, power became more and more 
concentrated in the office of the president after 1970 and through frequent reshuffling 
of the minister posts competition to the president was kept low (Rakner, 1998: 46,47; 
Burdette, 1988: 75).  
 In the first years after independence, however, Zambia did fairly well 
economically due to high revenues from copper exports (Rakner at al., 1999: 20). 
Also, these revenues were used by the state to improve the fate of the population, 
following first an ideology of African Socialism and then Kaunda’s own ideology 
Humanism (Rakner, 1998: 50). This was done through investing heavily in education 
and health programmes (Burdette, 1988: 64) with the aim of a developmental state 
that could remove the colonial inequalities (Rakner, 1998: 44).  
 In order to achieve that, the Kaunda regime maintained the economic 
structures inherited by the British and used the copper mines, that soon after 
independence were nationalised in 1969, as the major source of state income (Good, 
1986: 246; ), which is another characteristics of a neo-patrimonial state (Kohli, 2004: 
397). The mining income was in turn invested in the construction of an extensive, 
rather subsidy-dependent parastatal sector (Phiri, 2006: 135)19, which turned into the 
major employer and contributor to economic growth, though at the disadvantage of 
the rural subsistence farmers, who did not receive any support (Thurlow and Wobst, 
2006: 605). Also, this move made virtually every part of Zambia’s economy very 
dependent on mining incomes and food imports after a few years (Good, 1986: 251; 
Hawkins, 1991: 841). This proved to be fatal for Zambia when copper world prices 
began to fall rapidly in the 1970s (Rakner, 2003: 53)20 and the state began to borrow 
                                                
19 As Hawkins further explains: “Although the parastatals were created to be "'import substitution" 
industries, they were by and large highly dependent on inputs purchased with foreign exchange. 
Foreign exchange was generated primarily by copper sales or foreign borrowing.” (Hawkins, 1991: 
842). 
20 To give an idea of the severeness of the crisis, from 1974 to 1980, the gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita declined by 52 percent (Burdette, 1988: 2).  
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heavily from foreign creditors, mainly the IMF to be able to keep up the level of state 
spending (Rakner, 1998: 63-65).  
 After a decade of both state and IMF ignoring the economic problems, the  
UNIP-government was in 1983 forced to follow WB and IMF guidelines regarding 
economic policy making in form of several structural adjustment programmes 
(Rakner et al., 1999: 21). These were, however, abandoned several times, which led to 
a cancellation of the loans and an increasingly unsatisfied population, because after 10 
years it now began to feel the economic crisis. “Under these circumstances, 
particularly the decline of the state, the civil society came to occupy an important 
position in the democratisation process in Zambia” (Phiri, 2006: 168). Hence, due to 
strong pressure from civil society on the UNIP government, the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) under Fredrick Chiluba could press for elections and 
won them in 1991 (Gordon and Gordon, 2007: 90; Rakner, 2001: 522). “People were 
not only prepared for change, but facilitated that change by withdrawing their support 
from the moribund UNIP” (Phiri, 2006: 168). They did so, even though extensive 
economic reforms were to follow under MMD (Rakner, 2001: 522).  
 These reforms accomplished some of the economic changes long demanded 
by the international financial institutions; for example to remove the trade protection 
that shielded the national market (Thurlow and Wobst, 2006: 606). Though, according 
to Lise Rakner, the economic liberalisation suffered from “partial implementation” 
and had grave socio-economic consequences (Rakner, 2003: 16; Hansen, 2008: 215; 
Phiri, 2006: 194). Hence, Zambia’s economic situation did not improve significantly 
during the 1990s and also “many claimed to see evidence of a decline in the quality of 
democracy” (Burnell, 2001: 240)21. Moreover, neo-patrimonial practices of the first 
and second republic were not abolished but rather, continued by the new president 
Chiluba and his associates. This included appointment of ministers to “an all time 
high of 28 posts” a year after assumption of office and “misuse of state resources 
often to the advantage of the ruling party”  (von Soest, 2007: 626, 627)22. In line with 
that, Chiluba attempted to change the constitution in order to make a third term in 
                                                
21 For example because former president Kaunda was banned from being a presidency candidate by a 
constitutional amendment specifically made for that purpose by MMD before the elections (Burnell, 
2001: 240). 
22 Also, “an inspection of the bank statements (of Chiluba) revealed a number of illegal and irregular 
financial transactions involving Chiluba, his family and close associates” (Simutanyi, 2006: 85). 
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office for him possible. This was, however, prevented through strong citizen protest 
and in 2001, Levy Mwanawasa was elected president (Simutanyi, 2006: 76).  
 Under Mwanawasa the state’s reform efforts show results and from 2001 on 
Zambia’s economy starts growing by an average of 4.5 per cent annually (Li, 2006: 
6). This seems also to be the trend under the newest president, Rupiah Banda who at 
assumption of office “promised to fight corruption and poverty and embrace sound 
economic policies that would ensure a strong Zambia to maintain investor 
confidence” (Nevin, 2008: 72).  
 
4.2.2. Formation of the state 
 
After this examination of state and development performance in Zambia after 
independence, it will now be looked at the processes that lead to the formation of the 
predominantly neo-patrimonial post-colonial state. This is done in order to gain an 
understanding of the differences in the state formation processes of Botswana and 
Zambia that lead to such different states. Like in the case of Botswana, the analysis 
will begin in pre-colonial Zambia. 
 To begin with, “the different peoples of modern Zambia have long and 
important, though separate histories. Zambia was not a ‘nation’ as defined by 
common language, kinship, political authority, or geographical distinctiveness until it 
was pieced together by British mercantile interests in the late nineteenth century” 
(Burdette, 1988: 5). This will say that the population of what now is Zambia has 
already in pre-colonial times been rather heterogeneous. One-fifth of the population is 
of Bemba origin, one-tenth respectively belongs to the ethnic group of the Nyanja and 
Tonga and the rest to various smaller ethnic groups (Encyclopaedia Britannica). All 
these ethnic groups lived on the territory that later became Zambia, but lived rather 
separated from each other and they all had their own political and social structures 
distinct from one another. Some were organised in kingdoms and ruled by a chief. 
Others, like the Tonga, had no chiefs or other form of authority (Burdette, 1988: 
10,11). Thus, the political and social structures of the ethnic groups living in the 
territory of modern Zambia are highly diverse. “One heritage of this diversity is that 
the peoples who compose modern-day Zambia have historically distinct concepts of 
political authority and legitimacy” (Burdette, 1988: 11). 
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 This will say that with the arrival of colonialism borders were drawn that 
mingled together a big number of different ethnic groups that had no common history. 
Further, the borders also divided some ethnic groups like the Lozi that had in pre-
colonial times formed a community (Burdette, 1988: 13). Hence, the pre-colonial 
forms of organisation just described were changed with the arrival of colonialism and 
the new “artificial” borders. As a result, no congruence between pre- and post-
colonial structures can be found.  
 A further brief look at the colonial period will examine this in more detail. 
Zambia has been under British control since 1890/91. First the territory was not 
directly controlled by Britain, but by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) 
under Cecile Rhodes. The BSAC negotiated a concession with the chief of 
Barotseland in 1890, and finally was able to occupy the rest of Zambia in 1891 
“through a series of dubious treaties” negotiated with various chiefs (Phiri, 2006: 9). 
Roughly 30 years later, from 1923 on, Zambia went from being controlled by the 
BSAC into a territory formally controlled by Britain, as one of its protectorates, until 
independence in 1964 (Phiri, 2006: 2, 3).  
 During the whole colonial time, but especially while the BSAC controlled 
Zambia, British investment in the country was kept at a minimal level. The only area 
the British did invest in strongly was the copper mining sector, which later on also 
became the foundation for independent Zambia’s economy (Good, 1986: 246, 248). 
Like in most British territories, there was only a minimal administration and instead 
the British ruled indirectly through the tribal chiefs who were responsible for example 
for collecting taxes from the population, which was met with resistance (Phiri, 2006: 
11). The taxes were introduced to force Zambians to work in the mines to be able to 
pay their taxes (Ibid.: 13). The positive consequence of the shortage of labour for 
Africans was, however, that some Africans had the chance to occupy relatively high 
positions in skilled labour and civil service. This led over time to “the emergence of a 
small elite with the education to understand modern political methods and readiness to 
take a lead in the development of modern African nationalism” (Ibid.: 13). 
 Despite this political emancipation of the small African elite, however, the 
British were highly involved in “choosing” an independence government (Good and 
Taylor, 2008: 753). On initiative of a businessmen, Sir Ronald Prain, involved in the 
mining they supported the more moderate Kenneth Kaunda and the UNIP, over the 
more radical African nationalist Harry Nkumbula and his party, the African National 
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Congress. Prain introduced Kaunda to the British officials and Kaunda consequently 
became Zambia’s first president in 1964 (Butler, 2007: 468-470). 
 
 
4.3. Commonalities and differences between the cases 
 
In the following, the differences between Botswana’s and Zambia’s development will 
be analyzed with help of the theoretical framework outlined in part 2. It will 
specifically be looked at the role the two states played in Botswana’s and Zambia’s 
differing development. Further, it will be examined in how far the theoretical 
framework explains the emergence of these two states and the differences between 
them. Also, it will briefly be assessed, if the same explanations can be used for both 
country cases, or if each requires a specific and individual explanation. 
 
 First, the theoretical framework from section 2 can be used to identify and 
compare the two different state types that formed after independence in Botswana and 
Zambia and give at least a partly explanation for why Botswana’s state was able to 
successfully direct development while Zambia’s was not. One of the main questions 
of this paper, namely, which role the two states played in achieving different 
developmental success in Zambia and Botswana will be addressed in this context. 
 To explain Botswana’s success in developing, the concept of a developmental 
state can be used. Though, it will be argued here that the classification is not 
completely straight forward, and that Botswana also exhibits characteristics of a neo-
patrimonial state that could under unfortunate circumstances turn out to be a hurdle to 
further successful development. 
 To begin with, the high amount of state power concentrated in the hands of 
few for the last fifty years in Botswana fits into the definition of cohesive-capitalist 
states given above which are perceived as the most successful states in directing 
economic development (Kohli, 2004: 385, 393, 418; Pierre and Peters, 2000: 181; 
Leftwich, 1993: 620). Also, the state’s extensive downward-reach that enables it to 
effectively control civil society (for example the labour unions and traditional chiefs) 
fits into the developmental or cohesive-capitalist state type. The Batswana state 
focussed on economic development-enhancing policies from the beginning on and 
had the power necessary to carry out these stringent growth-enforcing policies. This 
was probably facilitated by the close links between state elite and industrial/economic 
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elites, which made the state pursue policies beneficial to the country’s, and especially 
these elites’ economic development.  
 However, this is also where aspects of a neo-patrimonial state can be detected. 
The links between state and industrial elites are very close and as described above, 
clientelism and the exchange of favours seem to occur due to the elite’s unchallenged 
power position (Good and Taylor, 2006: 63, 64). Poor Batswana on the other hand, do 
not have much influence and do not seem to feel much of the successful economic 
development of the country (Good, 1999: 190, 199, 200). This is seen as a possible 
hurdle to further development, because as Leftwich explains: “To make market-friendly 
strategies work, developmental states in many societies will also need to liberate the 
poor, especially the rural poor, from the continued domination of traditional landed elites 
and anti-developmental oligarchs who both oppose empowerment and often stand in the 
way of development and democracy” (Leftwich, 1993: 620, 621). The landed elites in 
Botswana are, however, in many cases still perceiving the poor as their servants and 
responsible for their own situation (Nengwekhulu, 1998: 353; Good, 1999: 199). 
 Despite these “dark sides” of the Batswana state, it should be pointed out that 
overall the state elite managed the country very well, spending mineral earnings on 
health and education. This was done, it seems, in a sustainable way since Botswana 
did avoid the resource trap that many other mineral-owning countries, like for 
example Zambia fell into (Davis, 1998: 222).23 
 
Zambia, due to its rather more disrupted state history is more difficult to place into a 
state classification than Botswana, since its state changed significantly over time with 
the different regimes in power. Though neo-patrimonial in its main features, later on 
elements diverging from the neo-patrimonial model can be found as well.  
 The state in the first and second republic clearly exhibited most features of a 
neo-patrimonial state and some neo-patrimonial aspects were carried into the third 
republic. Power is very concentrated in the president, with no instance strong enough 
to exert control over him especially during the one-party state (Burnell, 2001: 251). 
Hence, during that time the Kaunda regime used state resources to build up a network 
of patronage to strengthen its support, which all worked fine, while copper prices 
were high. The state was however, not strong enough to carry out the “right” policies 
to deal with the economic crisis that was caused by the copper price collapse. This 
                                                
23 It should, however, be noted that despite the wealth, there are critics that see Botswana’s diamond 
depend economy and the lack of diversification as a serious problem for future economic development 
(Hillbom, 2008). 
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was for example due to its “vulnerability to urban protest” (Rakner et al. 1999: 7, 20-
22) and the huge network of beneficiaries that gave support to the government in 
exchange for favours (Von Doepp, 1996: 30). These would of course no longer 
support the government if favours stayed out. These neo-patrimonial practices seem to 
have carried on under the next president, Chiluba (Simutanyi, 2006: 83-85).  
 During Chiluba’s time in office however, civil society, especially through the 
trade unions that are amongst Africa’s strongest (Freedomhouse, 2009), grew stronger 
and a certain extent of control can now be exerted over the president and the 
government. This can be seen in the fact that Chiluba had to abandon his plan to 
change the constitution and stay in office for a third term due to strong societal 
pressure (Ibid.: 76). This does not fit into the stereotype of a neo-patrimonial state and 
gives hope that against Kohli’s assessment that a move of a neo-patrimonial state 
towards other state types is very rare (Kohli, 2004: 17), Zambia is on its way to break 
away from neo-patrimonial patterns, with improved economic management (Nevin, 
2008: 72, Li, 2006: 6) and democratic elections in the last few years (Freedomhouse 
2009).  
 What the theoretical framework does not address, however, is the role of 
external influences on the state’s policy choices. In the case of Zambia, foreign states 
and international financial institutions had a strong influence on the country’s policies 
due to Zambia’s heavy debts burden. In Botswana on the other hand the state could 
make policy choices independently because no significant foreign debt existed. 
 
 After having found that in the cases of Botswana and Zambia, two quite 
different states directed or in Zambia’s case for the most time rather ‘mis’directed the 
countries’ development it will now be focussed on the reasons for the formation of 
these two different states. 
 Through examining the two cases it becomes clear that an explanation like 
“certain colonial powers influence led to certain types of states” (see Kohli, 2004: 
309, 409) cannot be used in these two cases. Botswana and Zambia were both 
colonised by the British and suffered both from the neglect of the colonial power at 
independence. Following this line of argumentation, the Zambian state should actually 
have better chances to consolidate into a strong state after independence since the 
British left slightly more administrative and industrial infrastructure than in 
Botswana. This was, however, not the case. The explanation given by Englebert and 
 30 
others on the other hand, to start looking for the reasons for state formation already in 
the pre-colonial history of the country, seems more useful for explaining the two cases 
dealt with here.  
 In the examination of state formation in sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.2 it becomes 
evident that pre-colonial conditions, and related to that the level of congruence 
between pre-colonial and post-colonial state, vary greatly in Botswana and Zambia. 
While Botswana’s borders roughly resembled the territory of the Tswana kingdoms 
and therefore one political system, Zambia’s colonial borders mingled together a huge 
variety of different ethnic groups with different forms of political organisation.  
 As a consequence, congruence between pre-colonial and post-colonial 
structures was not possible in Zambia due to the “artificiality” of the state created 
during colonialism. This, in agreement with the framework outlined above, led to a 
post-colonial state that was perceived as highly illegitimate by most citizens due to its 
lacking roots in the peoples’ pre-colonial political traditions (Englebert, 2000a: 97; 
Englebert, 2000c: 1823; Gordon and Gordon, 2007: 60). This high level of 
illegitimacy in turn, is responsible for the state’s strong focus on securing its power 
through patrimonalism and clientelistic practices, rather than focussing on the 
country’s development. 
 In Botswana, on the other hand, the post-colonial state structures resembled 
the pre-colonial ones very much with for example the president being the heir of the 
traditional chieftaincy. Also, one ethnic group dominated the territory, which 
eliminates the danger of ethnic rivalries for state power. In all, that the state is 
perceived as a legitimate one can be explained due to its roots in the pre-colonial past. 
This in turn equips the government with sufficient power to focus on ruling and 
developing the country, rather than having to invest all its energy in increasing power 
in order to be able to stay in government.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
 
 
 
Coming back to the questions posed in the beginning of the paper, some light could be 
shed on the reasons for the two countries’ differing development. The theoretical 
framework developed could explain a great deal about the state’s differing 
developmental capacities and also why states with differing developmental capacities 
form in the two cases examined.  
 More specifically it was found that in both cases the state played a key role in 
determining developmental success or failure. Also, and coming back to the debate 
touched upon in the introduction, Botswana provides a good example for a strong 
state that successfully directed the country’s development. By looking at Zambia and 
analysing the differences between the two states, an insight could be gained into the 
conditions that are necessary for such a strong and developmentally successful state to 
form, and why not all states develop as strong Botswana-like states. It seems, 
however, very difficult to generalise from these findings because as pointed out, 
already when looking at the two cases, different factors influenced the developmental 
outcomes in differing degrees. A point to be highlighted in this relation is that in 
Zambia outside influences in form of lender countries and institutions seem to have 
had a much stronger impact on the state’s ability to act independently. Also, the 
formation of the state in both cases has been highly influenced by external factors, 
though leading to different results that were more favourable for Botswana’s state 
than for Zambia’s. The issue of external influences could due to the limited space not 
be investigated further but a better understanding of this process could be helpful in 
improving development cooperation between developed and less developed countries 
and provide an interesting topic for further research. 
 Lastly some critical thoughts concerning the findings of the paper should be 
voiced. These concern the issues of equal distribution of the benefits of development 
and the importance of democracy. First one could question whether a strong state elite 
as in the case of Botswana could in the long run hinder an equal distribution of the 
benefits of successful economic development and therewith development for parts of 
the population. Moreover, one could argue that a strong state with a small elite, which 
is beneficial to development, necessarily comes at the expense of democracy. If that is 
 32 
the case, then is this type of state in the long run really beneficial to the populations’ 
(not only economic) development? Next to the question of external influences, these 
two issues could prove interesting to look at further. 
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